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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Creditors who file an involuntary bankruptcy petition 
against a debtor must satisfy several statutory requirements 
before obtaining relief.  See 11 U.S.C. § 303.  Everyone 
agrees the creditors who filed the petition in this case met 
those requirements.  The question is whether their petition 
may nonetheless be dismissed as a bad-faith filing.  We hold 
that bad faith provides an independent basis for dismissing an 
involuntary petition.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm.  
 
I. 
 
 The parties are familiar foes.  Founded by Keith Day, 
Forever Green Athletic Fields sells artificial turf playing 
fields.  In 2005, Forever Green sued one of its competitors, 
ProGreen, for $5 million for diversion of corporate assets (the 
“Bucks County Action”).  Charles Dawson, who is an owner 
of ProGreen and a former Forever Green sales representative, 
would be liable if damages are awarded in that suit. 
 
 That same year, Charles and his wife, Kelli Dawson, 
sued Forever Green for unpaid commissions and wages (the 
“Louisiana Action”).  On March 2, 2011, after years of 
litigation, the Louisiana court entered a consent judgment in 
favor of the Dawsons.  With interest and other costs, this 
judgment now totals more than $300,000.  To date, Forever 
Green has not paid a penny on this judgment. 
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 While the Louisiana Action was still running its 
course, the parties to the Bucks County Action agreed to 
arbitrate their claims.  However, on March 30, 2011, just a 
few weeks after the consent judgment was entered in the 
Louisiana Action, ProGreen filed a motion to terminate the 
arbitration.  In support of this motion, ProGreen argued that 
“it has become clear that [Forever Green] is insolvent” and 
that Keith Day does not “have the ability or desire to pay the 
Arbitrator’s fees and expenses.”  Supp. App. 505.  In 
addition, ProGreen said that “Charles and Kelli Dawson have 
a $300,000+ judgment against [Forever Green] and expect 
judgments in the same amount against [Day] very soon.  As 
such, any monies paid as advance deposits to the Arbitrator 
by [Forever Green] are subject to execution and 
garnishment.”  Id.  The next month, the Dawsons transferred 
their judgment in the Louisiana Action to Pennsylvania and 
obtained a writ of execution against the arbitrator and his law 
firm.  At that point, with his fees in peril, the arbitrator 
recognized he was adverse to the Dawsons, so he suspended 
the arbitration until the fee issue was resolved. 
 
 During his deposition, Charles Dawson offered some 
strategic insight into these actions.  With the consent 
judgment in hand, he intended to “[f]ind any available asset 
that Forever Green may have and try to use the lien to seize 
it.”  Id. at 710.  He testified, “I’m going to use that judgment 
to levy any monies I can find anywhere, whether it be the 
arbitrator or anyone else.  So, yeah, if we can get the lien 
paid, that’s my number one objective.  If I can get it paid, I’m 
very happy.”  Id. at 711. 
 
 In response to the suspension of the arbitration, 
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Forever Green filed a complaint in state court trying to 
reinstate the arbitration (the “Philadelphia Action”).  Day 
testified that Forever Green was forced to file this complaint 
because “Charles Dawson and his counsel were determined to 
derail the arbitration and this was our own legitimate response 
to it.”  Id. at 198.  According to Day, Charles Dawson and his 
counsel had “threatened to put [Forever Green] into 
bankruptcy” if Forever Green did not agree to terminate the 
arbitration.  Id. at 199.  After Forever Green commenced the 
Philadelphia Action, the Dawsons’ counsel sent a letter to 
Forever Green saying that the arbitration was in an “indefinite 
state of suspension” and “[u]nless and until the [consent 
judgment] for about $300,000.00 is paid off in full, that 
indefinite state of suspension will continue.”  Id. at 568. 
 
 The judge in the Philadelphia Action issued a 
scheduling order for the parties to brief the issues identified in 
Forever Green’s complaint.  The Dawsons’ brief was due on 
May 3, 2012.  They never filed it.  Instead, they chose a 
different tack.   
 
 Two weeks before their brief was due, the Dawsons 
and the law firm Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall & Furman, 
which was owed $206,000 from Forever Green, filed an 
involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Forever 
Green.  Justifying this decision, Charles Dawson said that his 
counsel “suggested the best way to get to [Forever Green’s] 
assets would be involuntary bankruptcy.”  App. 268.  It is 
undisputed that the Dawsons and Cohen Seglias satisfied the 
statutory criteria for commencing an involuntary bankruptcy 
case because (1) they are three creditors, (2) they each hold 
an uncontested claim against Forever Green, and (3) their 
claims aggregate at least $15,325 more than the value of liens 
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on Forever Green’s property.  See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b).  
Despite the petitioning creditors’ facial compliance with the 
statute, Forever Green moved to dismiss the petition as a bad-
faith filing.   
 
 The Bankruptcy Court convened an evidentiary 
hearing on the motion.  In addition to receiving evidence of 
the parties’ course of conduct in the years leading up to the 
filing, the Bankruptcy Court heard testimony about Forever 
Green’s financials.  It was established that Forever Green has 
essentially shut down its business—in 2012, its operating 
account had no activity and its balance never exceeded $30.  
Forever Green’s focus has been on winding down its affairs 
and recovering assets for its approximately 50 creditors.  As 
for the balance sheet, Forever Green has $6 million in assets, 
the largest by far being its claims against ProGreen for $5 
million.  On the other side of the ledger, Forever Green has 
$2.3 million in debts, including a $1.3 million secured line of 
credit. 
 
 Although Forever Green itself has not been paying any 
of its debts, Day has personally paid off hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of Forever Green debt.  He explained 
that he has paid debts for which he had “financial personal 
guarantees.”  App. 256.  Day acknowledged that neither he 
nor Forever Green has paid anything to the Dawsons, but he 
said that secured creditors and certain unsecured creditors are 
ahead of them in the pecking order.  Day also is personally 
funding all of Forever Green’s current litigation, including 
this suit and the suspended arbitration against ProGreen. 
 
 After the parties made their pitches as to whether the 
petition was filed in bad faith, the Bankruptcy Court ruled in 
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Forever Green’s favor and granted the motion to dismiss.  It 
explained that, because bankruptcy courts are courts of 
equity, a petitioning creditor (for involuntary bankruptcies) or 
debtor (for voluntary bankruptcies) must come to the court for 
a proper purpose.  Involuntary Chapter 7 proceedings, it said, 
are intended to protect creditors from debtors who are making 
preferential payments to other creditors or from the 
dissipation of the debtor’s assets.  Creditors who file petitions 
for other reasons—such as to collect on a personal debt, to 
gain an advantage in pending litigation, or to harass the 
debtor—act in bad faith.  The Bankruptcy Court concluded 
that, even though the petitioning creditors met the statutory 
filing requirements, Charles Dawson was a bad-faith creditor 
because he was motivated by two improper purposes:  to 
frustrate Forever Green’s efforts to litigate its claim against 
ProGreen and to collect on a debt.  The District Court 
affirmed.  The Dawsons (without Cohen Seglias) filed this 
appeal.1 
 
II. 
 
 We discuss three issues on appeal.  First, whether an 
involuntary petition may be dismissed as a bad-faith filing.  
Second, whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding bad 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §  
158(a)(1), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§  
158(d)(1) and 1291.  We employ the same standard of review 
over the Bankruptcy Court’s decision as that exercised by the 
District Court.  We review the Bankruptcy Court’s findings of 
fact for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.  In re 
Zinchiak, 406 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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faith.  And third, whether other good-faith creditors could 
have cured the petition.  
A. 
 
 Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs 
involuntary cases under Chapter 7 or 11, contains three 
requirements for commencing an action against a debtor who 
has twelve or more creditors:  (1) there must be three or more 
petitioning creditors; (2) each petitioning creditor must hold a 
claim against the debtor that is not contingent as to liability or 
the subject of a bona fide dispute; and (3) the claims must 
aggregate at least $15,325 more than the value of liens on the 
debtor’s property.  11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1).  It is undisputed 
that the Dawsons and Cohen Seglias satisfied these three 
requirements.  The Code further provides that the court “shall 
order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case . . . only 
if . . . the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as 
such debts become due.”  Id. § 303(h)(1).  The parties agree 
Forever Green is not paying its debts. 
 
 Section 303 has one reference to bad faith.  It says that 
if the court dismisses an involuntary petition, it may award 
damages against any creditor “that filed the petition in bad 
faith.”  Id. § 303(i)(2).  As one might expect, because the only 
mention of bad faith is in § 303(i)(2) and deals with post-
dismissal damages, the vast majority of litigation concerning 
bad faith centers on that provision.  In the typical case, the 
creditors do not satisfy the § 303(b) requirements for filing 
the petition in the first instance (e.g., fewer than three 
creditors filed the petition or the creditors’ claims were 
subject to bona fide disputes).  Following dismissal, debtors 
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invariably file motions for damages under § 303(i)(2), 
arguing the petition was filed in bad faith.2 
 
 Less often litigated is the issue here, namely, whether 
bad faith may serve as a basis for dismissal even where the 
criteria for commencing a suit are satisfied and where the 
debtor is admittedly not paying its debts as they become due.  
According to the Dawsons, we cannot engage in a bad-faith 
inquiry in these circumstances.  They say a creditor’s 
subjective motivations are irrelevant because § 303(b)(1) 
contains objective criteria for who may file an involuntary 
petition, and if they are satisfied, § 303(h)(1) provides that the 
court “shall order relief” against a debtor who is not paying 
its debts.  Some courts have been receptive to this position.3  
                                              
2 See, e.g., In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 439 F.3d 
248, 257 (6th Cir. 2006); In re Bayshore Wire Prods. Corp., 
209 F.3d 100, 102-03 (2nd Cir. 2000); In re Express Car & 
Truck Rental, Inc., 440 B.R. 422, 433 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010); 
In re Skyworks Ventures, Inc., 431 B.R. 573, 578-79 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. 2010); In re Silverman, 230 B.R. 46, 49 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1998). 
3 See, e.g., In re WLB-RSK Venture, No. BAP CC-03-1526-
MOPMA, 2004 WL 3119789, at *6 n.13 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Nov. 24, 2004) (“Section 303 sets forth the standards for 
granting or denying an order for relief on an involuntary 
petition.  If the grounds for relief exist under section 303, the 
good or bad faith of the petitioning creditor appears 
irrelevant . . . .”); In re Knoth, 168 B.R. 311, 315 (D.S.C. 
1994) (“[T]he motivation of the petitioning creditors is 
irrelevant on the question of whether the involuntary petition 
should be granted.”). 
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Section 303, furthermore, discusses bad faith only in the 
context of assessing damages after a petition has been 
dismissed.  If Congress wanted bad faith to be a separate 
basis for dismissal, one could argue, the Code would have 
included language to that effect.  And although this Court has 
repeatedly held that a voluntary petition may be dismissed for 
bad faith, the provisions of the Code at issue in those cases 
permitted dismissal for “cause.”4  Section 303, by contrast, 
does not have any similar statutory hook for allowing bad-
faith dismissals.  Congress must have intended something by 
this distinction, the argument goes.    
 
 We disagree that the text of § 303 forecloses bad-faith 
dismissals.  The Dawsons make much of the fact that they 
satisfied § 303(b)(1)’s three requirements for commencing an 
involuntary petition.  But meeting the § 303(b)(1) criteria, 
like pleading a prima facie case in many actions, is just the 
first hurdle.  It does not bear on other defenses that may 
support dismissal.  In other words, if the three filing 
requirements are not satisfied, we agree the bankruptcy court 
must dismiss the case; but if the three requirements are 
satisfied, that doesn’t mean the bankruptcy court can’t 
                                              
4 See, e.g., In re Myers, 491 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A 
bankruptcy filing made in bad faith may be dismissed ‘for 
cause’ under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c).”); In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 
205, 207 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Section 707(a) allows a bankruptcy 
court to dismiss a petition for cause if the petitioner fails to 
demonstrate his good faith in filing.”); In re SGL Carbon 
Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
“Chapter 11 petition is subject to dismissal for ‘cause’ under 
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) unless it is filed in good faith”).  
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dismiss the case.  
 
 The one reference to bad faith in § 303 supports our 
conclusion.  Section 303(i)(2) allows a bankruptcy court to 
award damages following dismissal against “any petitioner 
that filed the petition in bad faith.”  Under the Dawsons’ 
reading, courts may engage in a bad-faith inquiry only after 
they have dismissed a case for the creditors’ failure to comply 
with the statutory filing requirements.  We see no reason why 
the Code would permit the imposition of damages (including 
punitive damages) for bad-faith filings but not allow the same 
conduct—such as using involuntary bankruptcy as a litigation 
tactic in pending proceedings—to provide a basis for 
dismissing the petition.  The better view is that, by including 
an express reference to bad faith in § 303, Congress intended 
for bad faith to serve as a basis for both dismissal and 
damages. 
 
 Section 303(h)(1), moreover, does not provide that a 
bankruptcy court “shall order relief” against a debtor who is 
not paying its debts.  Rather, the court shall order relief “only 
if” the debtor is not paying its debts, meaning a debtor not 
paying its debts is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
ordering relief.  An “if” or “if and only if” clause would have 
been more favorable to the Dawsons. 
 
 The bigger flaw in the Dawsons’ argument is that it 
overlooks the equitable nature of bankruptcy.  Time and 
again, we have emphasized that “good faith” filing 
requirements have “strong roots in equity.”  In re SGL 
Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161; see also In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d at 
207.  “At its most fundamental level, the good faith 
requirement ensures that the Bankruptcy Code’s careful 
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balancing of interests is not undermined by petitioners whose 
aims are antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy.”  In 
re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  As courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are 
equipped with the doctrine of good faith so that they can 
patrol the border between good- and bad-faith filings.  See In 
re SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161; In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 
779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the 
“good faith” requirement protects the “integrity of the 
bankruptcy courts by rendering their powerful equitable 
weapons . . . available only to those debtors and creditors 
with ‘clean hands’”).  We will not depart from this general 
“good faith” filing requirement in the context of involuntary 
petitions for bankruptcy.  The majority of courts agree.5 
                                              
5 See, e.g., In re U.S. Optical, Inc., No. 92-1496, 1993 WL 
93931, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 1993) (unpublished) (“Courts 
are duty bound to conduct an inquiry, if requested, to 
determine whether an involuntary petition has been filed in 
good faith.  Bad faith filings are to be dismissed.” (citations 
omitted)); In re Bock Transp., Inc., 327 B.R. 378, 381 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 2005) (“A bad faith filing can also be cause for the 
dismissal of a[n] [involuntary] petition.”); In re Tichy Elec. 
Co., 332 B.R. 364, 373 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (same); In re 
Alexander, No. 00-10500, 2000 WL 33951465, at *3 (D. Vt. 
Aug. 29, 2000) (“[I]nvoluntary petitions filed in bad faith 
should be dismissed.”); In re Manhattan Indus., Inc., 224 
B.R. 195, 201 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (“Section 303(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly refer to good faith 
filings.  Involuntary filings must be made in good faith and 
consequences flow if they are not.  Dismissal is one possible 
consequence.”).  
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 Policy considerations lend further support to this 
conclusion.  “[T]he filing of an involuntary petition is an 
extreme remedy with serious consequences to the alleged 
debtor, such as loss of credit standing, inability to transfer 
assets and carry on business affairs, and public 
embarrassment.”  In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 
1985).  Given these serious consequences, courts should be 
wary of creditors who may find alluring the “retributive 
quality” of thrusting a debtor into bankruptcy.6  Allowing for 
the dismissal of bad-faith filings will encourage creditors to 
file petitions for proper reasons such as to protect against the 
preferential treatment of other creditors or the dissipation of 
the debtor’s assets.  See In re Silverman, 230 B.R. at 53.  
Accordingly, we hold that an involuntary petition filed under 
11 U.S.C. § 303 may be dismissed for bad faith.  
 
B. 
 
 We review the decision to dismiss the case as a bad-
faith filing for abuse of discretion.  In re Myers, 491 F.3d at 
125.  The determination of bad faith is “a fact intensive 
                                              
6 Brad E. Godshall & Peter M. Giluhy, The Involuntary 
Bankruptcy Petition:  The World’s Worst Debt Collection 
Device?, 53 Bus. Law. 1315, 1315 (Aug. 1998); see also 
David S. Kennedy et al., The Involuntary Bankruptcy 
Process:  A Study of the Relevant Statutory and Procedural 
Provisions and Related Matters, 31 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1, 58 
(Fall 2000) (explaining that creditors should not “invoke the 
involuntary bankruptcy process . . . based on personal whim 
or vindictiveness seeking to collect an unpaid debt”). 
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determination better left to the discretion of the bankruptcy 
court.”  In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations 
omitted).  In terms of allocating burdens of proof, creditors 
are presumed to have acted in good faith.  See In re Bayshore, 
209 F.3d at 105.  To dismiss the petition, the debtor must 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the creditors 
acted in bad faith.  In re Petralex Stainless Ltd., 78 B.R. 
7389, 743 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 
 At the outset, we must decide on the standard for 
evaluating bad faith, which is not defined in the Code.  On 
this issue, courts have applied a dizzying array of standards, 
mostly with regard to post-dismissal motions for damages 
under § 303(i)(2).  See In re Bayshore, 209 F.3d at 105-06 
(reviewing different standards); Gen. Trading Inc. v. Yale 
Materials Handling Corp., 119 F.3d 1485, 1501-02 (11th Cir. 
1997) (same).  Some courts, for instance, apply an “improper 
use” test, which asks whether a “petitioning creditor uses 
involuntary bankruptcy procedures in an attempt to obtain a 
disproportionate advantage for itself, rather than to protect 
against other creditors obtaining disproportionate advantages, 
particularly when the petitioner could have advanced its own 
interest in a different forum.”  In re K.P. Enter., 135 B.R. 
174, 179 n.14 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Other courts apply an “improper purpose” test, 
which looks to whether the filing “was motivated by ill will, 
malice, or a desire to embarrass or harass the alleged debtor.”  
In re Bayshore, 209 F.3d at 105.  Still others apply an 
“objective test,” which assesses what a reasonable person 
would have believed and what a reasonable person would 
have done in the creditor’s position.  In re Wavelength, Inc., 
61 B.R. 614, 620 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).  And yet other 
courts have applied a broad “totality of the circumstances” 
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standard, which effectively combines all the tests and looks to 
both subjective and objective evidence of bad faith.  In re 
John Richards, 439 F.3d at 255 n.2. 
 
 We adopt the “totality of the circumstances” standard 
for determining bad faith under § 303.  This standard is most 
suitable for evaluating the myriad ways in which creditors 
filing an involuntary petition could act in bad faith.  It also is 
the same standard we apply when reviewing allegations that a 
debtor filed a voluntary petition in bad faith.  See In re Myers, 
491 F.3d at 125; In re Lilley, 91 F.3d at 496.  In conducting 
this fact-intensive review, courts may consider a number of 
factors, including, but not limited to, whether:  the creditors 
satisfied the statutory criteria for filing the petition; the 
involuntary petition was meritorious; the creditors made a 
reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law 
before filing; there was evidence of preferential payments to 
certain creditors or of dissipation of the debtor’s assets; the 
filing was motivated by ill will or a desire to harass; the 
petitioning creditors used the filing to obtain a 
disproportionate advantage for themselves rather than to 
protect against other creditors doing the same; the filing was 
used as a tactical advantage in pending actions; the filing was 
used as a substitute for customary debt-collection procedures; 
and the filing had suspicious timing. 
 
 Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that Charles Dawson filed the 
involuntary petition in bad faith.  In the Bankruptcy Court’s 
view, “Dawson’s prepetition conduct indicates that his 
litigation strategy was to use any means necessary to force the 
payment of the Consent Judgment and the abandonment of 
 16 
 
Forever Green’s claims against [ProGreen].”  In re Forever 
Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 500 B.R. 413, 427 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2013).  In the weeks after Dawson obtained the consent 
judgment in the Louisiana Action, he filed a motion to 
terminate Forever Green’s arbitration proceedings against 
ProGreen, which arose from the separate Bucks County 
Action and sought $5 million in damages.  Light on 
meritorious arguments, Dawson’s plan was to use the consent 
judgment to garnish the arbitrator’s fees, thereby forcing the 
arbitrator to halt the arbitration.  Dawson and his counsel said 
they would keep the arbitration suspended until Forever 
Green paid on the consent judgment.  They also threatened to 
file an involuntary petition unless Forever Green agreed to 
stop the proceedings.  Keeping his word, Dawson filed an 
involuntary petition after Forever Green tried to reinstate the 
arbitration. 
 
 As the Bankruptcy Court found, Dawson’s actions ran 
counter to the spirit of collective creditor action that should 
animate an involuntary filing.  He put his own interests above 
all others.  By trying to end the arbitration, Dawson was 
obstructing Forever Green from pursuing its largest asset, the 
potential proceeds of which Forever Green could have used to 
pay its creditors.  He was also using the bankruptcy process to 
exert pressure on Forever Green to pay the consent judgment 
without regard to Forever Green’s other creditors, many of 
which had higher priority claims.  Courts routinely find it 
improper for creditors to use the bankruptcy courts to gain a 
personal advantage in other pending actions or as a debt-
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collection device.7   
 Nor is there any evidence that Dawson engaged in the 
type of due diligence and sober decision-making process that 
should precede any involuntary filing.  Instead, the suspicious 
timing of Dawson’s filing—days before his responsive brief 
was due in the Philadelphia Action—and his threatening 
comments to Day suggest he was just using bankruptcy as an 
alternative weapon for stopping the arbitration and cashing in 
on the consent judgment.  If Dawson had done an 
investigation prior to filing, he would have learned that 
Forever Green was not making preferential payments to its 
creditors.  Although Day was using his personal assets to pay 
some of Forever Green’s creditors who also happened to be 
his creditors, the Dawsons offer no argument as to why we 
should attribute these payments to Forever Green.  Further 
absent from the record is any evidence of Forever Green’s 
                                              
7 See, e.g., In re Nordbrock, 772 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 
1985) (“A creditor does not have a special need for 
bankruptcy relief if it can go to state court to collect a debt.”); 
In re Tichy, 332 B.R. at 374 (“Bad faith has been found to 
exist when a creditor’s actions amount to an improper use of 
the Bankruptcy Code as a substitute for customary collection 
procedures.”); In re WLB-RSK Venture, 296 B.R. 509, 515 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003) (“[Creditor] filed this involuntary 
petition against the alleged debtor as a litigation tactic . . . .”); 
In re Silverman, 230 B.R. at 53 (“Filing an involuntary 
petition with the intent to gain a strategic advantage . . . 
constitutes an improper purpose.”); In re Dami, 172 B.R. 6, 
10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (“Where the purpose of the 
bankruptcy filing is to defeat state court litigation without a 
[bankruptcy] purpose, bad faith exists.”). 
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assets depleting.  The only supposed evidence of asset 
dissipation is Forever Green’s prosecution of its claims 
against ProGreen.  But Forever Green is not even footing the 
bill for any of its litigation—Day is.  And more importantly, 
as the Bankruptcy Court said, it is difficult to “credit[] the 
notion that the pursuit of Forever Green’s only asset that may 
yield a meaningful recovery to its creditors can be 
characterized as a dissipation of estate assets.  To the 
contrary, the very act of prosecuting this claim would be 
instrumental to the marshaling of assets integral to any 
bankruptcy administration.”  In re Forever Green, 500 B.R. at 
429-30.  Accordingly, the record supports the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision to dismiss the petition as a bad-faith filing. 
 
C. 
 
 The Dawsons’ final argument is that, even if Charles 
Dawson acted in bad faith, other good-faith creditors should 
have been given the chance to cure the petition.  This 
argument arises from 11 U.S.C. § 303(c), which provides that 
“[a]fter the filing of a petition . . . but before the case is 
dismissed or relief is ordered” other creditors may join the 
petition.  This provision provides for joinder of creditors as a 
matter of right.  See In re FKF Madison Park Grp. Owner, 
LLC, 435 B.R. 906, 907-08 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).  
 
 An interesting question percolating in the courts is the 
application of the so-called “bar to joinder” rule.  Under this 
rule, a petition that was filed in bad faith cannot be saved by 
joining good-faith creditors under § 303(c) prior to dismissal.  
Most courts find this type of curing impermissible and would 
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dismiss such a petition.8  A growing minority, however, find 
this rule unjustified because it blindly lumps good- and bad-
faith filers together and needlessly punishes everyone.9  The 
Dawsons would like us to adopt the latter view and allow 
their petition to be cured.  
 
 We need not take a stance on this issue because, even 
if we found the “bar to joinder” rule misguided, it is too late 
for any creditor to save the petition.  The text of § 303(c) 
allows creditors to join a petition “before the case is 
dismissed.”  In the cases discussing the “bar to joinder” rule, 
creditors actually sought to join the involuntary petition prior 
to dismissal.  The courts had to decide whether to dismiss the 
petition because of a bad-faith creditor even though other 
creditors, if allowed to join, could have cured the 
deficiencies.  By contrast, there is no evidence here that any 
creditor tried to join the petition before the case was 
                                              
8 See, e.g., Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. Mw. Processing Co., 
769 F.2d 483, 486 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Mylotte, David & 
Fitzpatrick, No. 07-11861, 2007 WL 2033812, at *9 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. July 12, 2007); In re R & A Bus. Assocs., Inc., No. 
99-2171, 1999 WL 820859, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1999); In 
re Centennial Ins. Assocs., Inc., 119 B.R. 543, 546-47 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1990).  
9 See, e.g., Fetner v. Haggerty, 99 F.3d 1180, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (per curiam); In re Hrobuchak, No. 5-14-bk-02098-
JJT, 2015 WL 1651074, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 
2015); In re Houston Reg’l Sports Network, L.P., 505 B.R. 
468, 477 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2014); In re FKF, 435 B.R. at 
908; In re Kidwell, 158 B.R. 203, 207 (E.D. Cal. 1993).  
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dismissed, leaving only two good-faith creditors when the 
statute requires three.  And there was plenty of time for Kelli 
Dawson or Cohen Seglias to recruit other potentially curing 
creditors—approximately nine months lapsed between the 
hearing on the motion to dismiss and the issuance of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision.  Section 303(c), therefore, 
provides no aid to the Dawsons.  See In re DSC, LTD., 486 
F.3d 940, 948 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the language of 
§ 303(c) “means that a would-be joining creditor must join, if 
at all, before the Court has dismissed an involuntary petition.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
